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ST JO'HN'S LAW -REVIEW
apply td the Dormitory .Authority so :as to prevent its being bound
by the. operation: df a:'contract irbitration -clause. The .significance
of this -decision, however, is found .in the Court's dictum that:
Assuming for the moment the validity of the Authority's argument that
it is identified with the State, we hold that the 'State "itself ts not
-nsulated against the operatson of an arbitration clause v; a contract
because the power to contract:inplies': the power to assent to the
settlement of disputes by means of arbitration 118
This part of the decision was.:criticized in the concurring opinion
of Judge Bergan, wherein he stated that "it seems injudicious,
as-.welP as unnecessary" '" -for the Court to have considered- this
question. -Relying upon the prmciples, of sovereign immunity, Judge
Bergan argued that under the majority holding a state officer
could waive-this immunity and subject the state to suit, without
the- "state' -havinig given its- consent.2 0
a The 'practitioner should note-that, as a .result of this decision,
fhe'state; its agencies and authorities, would appear to be bound
by- the -provisions of Article 75 of the, CPLR and by the relevant
ca~es decided thereunder if arbitration clauses appear in the con-
tract. It is possible that some procedural problems may arise
because of the application of Article- 75 -to the state,'2 but we must
await future decisions for their resolution.
ARTICLE 83-DISBURSEMENTS AND ADDITIONAL ALLOWANCES
CPLR 8303(a) Amendment.
CPLR 8303(a) has been amended to allow additional costs
to a party "whether or not costs have been awarded . " By this
amendment some confusion has been eliminated, and the intention
of the revisers has been clarified by a statement that a
party may ,- eligible for additional allowances even ft1lough.he is
not the party who has been awarded costs.
In addition, CPLR 8303(a) (1) has been amended so that
the- provwgon -is -ffow expressly applicable oily where the action
is to foreclose a mortgage on real property Thus, by this amend-
thent, the iiconsistency with CPLR 8302 (ay (1). is removed, and
the amgnded- section now ,conforms with its predecessor-CPA
"-'2-Dormitory Auth. v. Span Elec. Corp., 18 N.Y.2d 114, 118, 218 N.E2d
693, 696: 271 1.Y.S.2d 983, -986, (1966).- (Emphasis added.)9-' Id. at 119, 218 ,N.E.2d -at 696,-271 N.Y.S.2d at 987
20 Id. -at 12G, 218 4.E2d at 696,-'271 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
.21 In his concurring opinion, Judge Bergan mentions that "the statutory
mechanism-. or-- miple-nenting an award 'by- arbiteators, i.e., 'A judgment
shal- be ;entered' (CPLR 7514, Subd. [a]) would, in respect of the State,
be a procedftral fdtiity." Dormitory Auth. v. Span Elec. Corp., 18 N.Y2d
114, 120, 218r N.E.2d-693, 697, 27-1 N..Y.S.2d 983, 987- (1966).
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§ 1513--since no change in substance was intended by the drafts-
men.
DOMESTIc RELATIONS. LAw
Dom. Rel. Law § 240 Children can enforce their rights under
separation agreement.
Under Section 240 of the. Domestic Relations Law, the court
must give direction for the custody, care;. education, and main-
tenance of the children in any proceeding brought, for separation.
In Fornzan v. Fornman,12 2 the wife breached a. separation agreement,
which provided for the support of the children, thus relieving the
husband of his obligation under the agreement. 'However, in a
subsequent action, the husband was &dere&t to pay the wife pursuant
to the Uniform Support of Dependents Law1 23 the amount the
agreement had originally provided for. The children then sought
a declaratory judgment embracing parts of the separation agrtement
which were purported to have been made for them as third-party
beneficiaries.
As a general rule only the mother can enforce the agreement
directly against the father. 24 However, in the instant case, the
Court of Appeals held that where the mother's violatlon of this
agreement makes her incapable of enforcing it 6n behalf of the
infants, a procedural facility must' be provided fQr the enfoiceriient
of the rights of the infants. Therefore; in such a case, children
may enforce, as third-party beneficiaries, their-rights under separa-
tion agreements.
NE.w YoRy CITY CIVL CouRT ACT
CCA § 212. Court can grant stay of execution in proceeding to
recover possession of commercial realty.
In Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co. v. Miller,25 the
question was raised as to whether the Civil Court could grant a
stay of execution in a proceeding to recover possession of com-
mercial real property. Under Sections 751, 753, and 755 of the
RPAPL, courts are given explicit power to grant stays with
respect to residential property However, there is no sedfic giant
12217 N.Y2d 274, 217 N.E.2d 645, 270 N.Y.S2d 586 ('1966).-
223 N.Y. Dom. RT. LAw §§ 30-43. The purpose of this law is to secure
support for dependents from persons legally responsible for their support.
124 Kendall v. Kendall, 200 App. Div. 702, ,93 N.Y. -.Supp. 658 (1st
Dep't, 1922).
22550 Misc. 2d 40, 269 N.Y.S2d 471.- (Civil Ct. Brop-t, Counatr .1966),
